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Do women invest differently than men? We contribute to the answer of
this question by analysing the Panel on Household Finances (PHF) of the
German Bundesbank. This representative panel collects a wide variety of
behavioural and financial variables in the area of household finance. We
find that participation in risky assets is generally lower among women than
among men. Once risk attitude is controlled for, this effect shrinks to only
2.6 percent. We find no difference when single women are compared to single
men – even irrespective of other demographic variables. The raw gap in
capital market participation is mainly explained by different risk attitudes
and monetary endowments, but women would participate even less in the
capital market if they reacted as sensitively to risk aversion as their male
counterparts. Lastly, given participation in the market, we find that both
genders hold comparable portions of risky assets in their portfolios. Within
their risky assets, men invest more in certificates and listed shares whereas
women invest more in funds.
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1 Introduction
Do women invest differently than men? Standard finance theory suggests that—all else
equal—women’s participation rates in the capital market and the composition of their
portfolios should be no different from those of men. That is, investors—male or female—
should take on as much risk as is commensurate with their risk attitude. At first view and
perhaps contrary to this prediction, however, our analyses show that women participate
in the capital market about 8 percentage points less often than men and when they
do, their risky asset portfolios look different from those of their male counterparts. This
paper investigates if this phenomenon is in line with the level of risk appetite that women
in Germany report compared to men.
Specifically, we use the second wave of the Deutsche Bundesbank Panel on Household
Finances (PHF)1—a dataset that is representative of German households in 2014 and
that collects a variety of financial and behavioural variables in the household context—
to answer the following three questions: first, do women in Germany participate less
often in risky assets than men?; second, what determines the share of risky assets in
an investor’s portfolio given capital market participation and does it depend on the
investor’s gender?; and third, do women invest in different risky assets than men? We
exploit the fact that the PHF dataset not only includes demographic and economic but
also behavioural variables, namely the degree of risk aversion and patience as well as the
level of financial literacy. We control for these attitudes to investigate if the observed
gap is driven by gender per se or by behavioural factors.
With the dataset, we show that across households, the variation in participation in
risky assets and the share held in such assets are not a result of the investor’s gender. We
find that women participate significantly less in the capital market than men; however,
the investor’s attitude towards risk explains much more of the observed variation in
capital market participation than gender per se or any other explanatory variable. That
is, when a man and a woman of similar risk aversion are compared, the gender effect in
capital market participation rates drops by roughly one third and it shrinks to half that
size when we additionally control for a whole battery of socioeconomic characteristics.
We do not find a significant gender gap in the conditional share of risky assets held in
the household’s total financial assets. Yet, once women participate in capital market
assets, their portfolios look slightly different than men’s: while men tend to invest more
in listed shares and certificates within their menu of risky assets, women prefer fund
shares and fixed-income securities.
Our study is novel in several ways: we are the first to exploit the PHF dataset with the
specific goal of analysing gender effects in the realm of capital market participation and
portfolio allocation in Germany. We do this by using multivariate methods, i.e., we match
men and women with similar economic and demographic backgrounds. More specifically,
1For a description of the PHF and its research potential, see Altmann et al. (2020).
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we control for behavioural factors that are determinants of investment, precisely risk
aversion, patience, and financial literacy. Also, by reporting typical household portfolios,
we show that men and women invest according to their risk attitude.
Above and beyond earlier studies, we shed more light on the drivers of the raw gender
gap in capital market participation rates by decomposing that gap into determinants at
the personal and the household level. On the one hand, we find that two thirds of the
7.87 percent gap can simply be explained by different factor endowments of women, i.e.
lower income, wealth and financial literacy as well as their higher propensity of being
divorced or widowed and of being risk averse. In particular, if women had the same
risk attitude as men, their capital market participation would increase and the gender
gap would shrink. On the other hand, and more surprisingly, we find first evidence that
men’s risk attitude translates differently into capital market participation than women’s:
if a risk-averse woman had the same coefficients as the average, risk-averse man—that
is, if she behaved like a man while keeping her own factor endowments—she would be
substantially less likely to invest in the capital market. This finding suggests that risk-
averse men shy away from the capital market much more strongly than their otherwise
identical, female counterparts. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other study
that analyses the same phenomenon.
Our results correspond well with previous studies and enhance them in a number of
ways. For instance, we can confirm that women are more risk averse then men and thus,
are less willing to take financial risks and to participate in the capital markets, consistent
with the studies by Dohmen et al. (2011) and Falk et al. (2018). Furthermore, in terms
of the participation in risky assets, our results are in accordance with the findings by
Almenberg and Dreber (2015), who use Swedish data. Like them, we find that the raw
gender gap decreases drastically after controlling for relevant factors at the individual
level, but unlike them, a small gap of 2.6 percent in participation rates remains, even after
accounting for differences at the household level and, more importantly, risk aversion.
With our German household data, we broadly confirm other studies carried out for
Germany (Arrondel et al., 2016), the U.S. (Dimmock et al., 2016) and other, more
gender-equal countries like Finland (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), in addition to Sweden
as mentioned above.
Our results also tie well into the literature on joint financial decision making, such
as the papers by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), or more recently, Ke (Ke), who find
that in married households, men may have a greater influence on the participation in the
capital market and the risky portfolio. In the sample containing all households, we do
find evidence of a small gender effect if we do not control for any other factors. However,
this gap disappears when we add household-head and household characteristics to our
models. For single and single parent households only, our findings suggest that risk
aversion may play a less important role than in multi-person households, presumably
because in the latter, one’s financial decisions affect more persons than just the investor.
Furthermore, we find first evidence that women’s risk aversion is unaffected by the way
in which a financial decision is made. For all households as well as only single and single
parent households, we find a gender effect in risk attitude that is nearly identical in size.
That is, women’s risk aversion does not appear to depend on the household type.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section will briefly
summarise the related literature. Section 3 will describe the database, our methodology
and first descriptive evidence. In section 4, we will present the regression results of the
capital market participation and the risky asset share, as well as the typical portfolios
held by men and women. We also analyse the role of financial advice and decompose the
raw gender differential found in capital market participation rates. Section 5 discusses
the results and concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Women, capital market participation, and the share of risky assets
Is there a difference in participation rates in risky assets between men and women?
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), using U.S. data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances, find no gender investment gap. Instead, they find a significant impact of risk
attitude, hinting at the possibility that first and foremost, women’s decision to stay out
of the capital market may be explained by risk attitudes and not by their gender. In
a similar study using data from the 2011 wave of the Eurosystem Household Finance
and Consumption Survey, Arrondel et al. (2016) show that in most Eurozone countries,
there is no such gender difference. For Germany, this coefficient is virtually zero. Unlike
Haliassos and Bertaut, though, that study does not account for risk appetite.
Almenberg and Dreber (2015) analyse survey data approximately representative of
the Swedish population and report that a significant raw gender gap in capital market
participation is not robust to the inclusion of risk aversion. They do not perform any
analyses on the risky asset share of households participating in the capital market.
Coinciding results for capital market participation have also been found for the U.S.
(Dimmock et al., 2016) and in a paper by Halko et al. (2012), which is closest to ours
in form and spirit: using a large dataset of Finnish retail bank clients, the authors
document that the gender gap in participation rates disappears once risk attitude and
other control variables are added. Also, accounting for risk aversion halves the gender
difference in the conditional risky asset share, leaving an adjusted gap of 2.8 percentage
points. That is, most of the gender gap can be explained by factors that are on average
more favourable for men.
Further research shows that once women trade, they do so less often than men. One of
these studies is that by Barber and Odean (2001), who use a sample of 35,000 households
with a brokerage account. The differences between the genders are most pronounced
between male and female single households and less so between multi-person households
headed by men and women. Moreover, they show that women tend to hold portfolios that
contain less risk than men’s. However, it is noteworthy that this study does not control
for risk attitudes. Dorn and Huberman (2005), who study how frequently German men
and women trade, report a reduced gender effect when self-reported risk attitude is
accounted for. Deaves et al. (2009) conduct an experiment with German and Canadian
students and show that men trade equally often as women when overconfidence (but
not risk appetite) is controlled for. This finding is likely an artefact of the subject pool,
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which consists of students of rather mathematical, “male” fields.
Do women hold lower shares of risky assets than men? Charness and Gneezy (2012)
review data gained in 15 studies based on one investment game and find that in the ma-
jority of these studies, women (in most cases, students) make smaller investments in risky
assets than their male counterparts. In a sample of American university faculty aged 50
and older, however, Arano et al. (2010) find that in households where financial decisions
are made by a sole decision maker, there is no difference between the genders, conditional
on demographic as well as economic control variables. This result is supported by re-
search that evidences that financial risk seeking varies by demographic variables such as
age or the number of children: Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) show that women over
50 hold riskier portfolios than college-aged women—a phenomenon which may manifest
itself in the different subject pools of the two aforementioned studies. As soon as the
outcome of joint decision-making in a subsample of married households is studied, the
result changes: women who have spouses that influence them to hold a larger share of
risky assets in fact increase that share, and they do so by a higher rate than men with
spouses who exert the same influence over their husbands’ portfolios. This result implies
that women seek to hold lower shares of risky assets than men. Yet, while the authors
account for heterogeneity in age, marital status, and financial endowments, they do not
control for risk attitude, thereby neglecting an important determinant of financial risk
seeking.
2.2 Women and risk aversion
‘Gender’ proxies for a bundle of attributes, so what about gender is it exactly that
distinguishes women’s from men’s trading behaviour? One explanation for the low female
participation in risky assets is that women are on average more risk averse than men.
To test this hypothesis, a recent study by Falk et al. (2018) uses novel survey data on 76
countries that is representative both within countries and worldwide. Their results show
that, conditional on other factors, women are indeed significantly less risk tolerant than
men worldwide. This finding is confirmed by similar research by Dohmen et al. (2011),
who use a lottery choice experiment with which they elicit determinants of risk as well
as an additional dataset that is representative of the German resident adult population.
They find that not only are women more risk averse than men in general, but that this
risk attitude holds across all aspects of life—in sports and leisure, car driving, financial
matters, career, and health—and after controlling for a number of demographic and
economic variables. Moreover, the findings by Dohmen et al. show that people who are
unwilling to take risks in financial matters are less likely to own stocks. Hence, there
is reason to presume that women’s low participation in the capital market may not be
driven by their gender per se but rather by other factors that are independent of their
gender, most notably risk aversion.
Furthermore, studies of risk attitudes show that financial risk aversion may vary not
only between but also within the genders. Factors that may influence someone’s risk
appetite in the financial realm are, for instance, financial endowments, age or the number
of children (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998). But even though most studies agree that
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women are more risk averse then men on average, there are a few studies that find
contradicting results. One example is the paper by Harrison et al. (2007), which uses a
representative sample of the Danish adult population and finds no significant impact of
the investor’s gender on risk aversion. Yet, their study design makes it rather difficult to
draw meaningful and robust conclusions, given that the gender dummy does not enter
the regression at the same time as the other explanatory factors.
2.3 Other factors
It is often observed that women perform worse on tests of financial literacy than men. In
three surveys conducted in the U.S., the Netherlands and Germany, Bucher-Koenen et al.
(2017) find that women of all ages lack financial literacy compared to men. Even more
strikingly, they report that single and widowed women, for whom financial knowledge is
even more important, are even more likely to be financially illiterate. Moreover, using
the 2005 and 2006 waves of the De Nederlandsche Bank Household Survey, van Rooij
et al. (2011) show that low financial literacy is a deterrent to stock market participation.
We therefore also control for financial literacy in our regressions.
Also, (im)patience may play a role in financial decision making because investors may
prefer instant gratification over longer-term payoffs (e.g., Hastings and Mitchell, 2011).
That is, impatient investors may shy away from risky assets because they fear that they
cannot endure longer depressions in the capital markets. According to Falk et al. (2018),
Germans are relatively impatient with women being even more so than men.
Lastly, gender norms might influence men’s and women’s investment behaviour. The
study by Ke (Ke) is devoted to explaining financial decision-making with stereotypi-
cal female identity rather than with attitudes and behaviours that can be observed in
both genders. Ke investigates this relationship in an experiment involving married cou-
ples in the U.S. The theory underlying his research is that conservative gender identity
norms may make women feel less inclined to be concerned with “male” domains such
as investing. Consistent with this hypothesis, he finds that women who are primed
with stereotypical, female identity are less likely to contribute to the household decision-
making process. Likewise, men who are primed with male identity are less likely to
accept their wives’ financial advice. In an additional test using microdata on 30 million
U.S. households, he also confirms that households with female heads are less likely to
own stocks. All in all, Ke’s results show that social norms can have real consequences.
Like most previous studies, though, he does not control for risk attitudes nor for other
behavioural variables.
3 Data and method
Similar to, for instance, Campbell (2006), Arrondel et al. (2016) and Black et al. (2018),
our analysis of investment behaviour will be divided into the following three parts: first,
we investigate if there is a significant gender gap in the capital market participation
given other characteristics of the investor and the household as a whole. In the second
step, we analyse if the share of risky assets for the households which participate in the
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capital market varies by gender, conditional on other factors. Finally, we want to answer
the question if there are gender differences in the capital market portfolios of households
participating in the capital market.
3.1 Data
For our analysis we use data from the second wave of the Panel on Household Finances
(PHF) from the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). As a representative panel
survey, it covers information on German households’ wealth composition, income, work
life as well as other demographic characteristics. The data for the second wave were
collected from April to November 2014 and contains information on 4,461 households
with 9,259 persons aged 16 years or older. The dataset is multiply imputed and contains
population weights such that we can compute descriptives for the whole population. For
each household, an interviewer identifies a financially knowledgeable person (FKP) who
can provide the necessary information about the household.
For the analysis of our three research questions, we need different household character-
istics, which are presented in the following. The corresponding descriptives are presented
in subsection 3.2.
Dependent variables
We use the following dependent variables:
Capital market participation. In order to cover a household’s capital market partic-
ipation, we define a dummy variable which is one for households directly or indirectly
holding listed shares, fund shares, certificates or fixed income securities such as govern-
ment bonds, corporate, and bank bonds. We define indirect holdings in risky assets as
holdings which are part of private pension plans. The most common form of private
pension plans in Germany are Rürup or Riester contracts for which the holders receive
government subsidies and tax deductions.
Share of risky assets in the financial assets. The share of the risky assets in the
financial assets is measured as the proportion of directly or indirectly held listed shares,
fund shares, certificates or fixed income securities such as government bonds, corporate,
and bank bonds relative to the financial assets of the household.2 Financial assets
constitute checking accounts, life insurance contracts, savings accounts, building loan
contracts, the portfolio of risky assets, outstanding debts, the credit card balance and
other assets3. For all households without financial assets, we set the risky share to
missing in order to avoid a division by zero.
Participation in different categories of capital market assets. In order to cover the
participation in different categories of capital market assets, we define dummy variables
for the direct or indirect holding of listed shares, fund shares, certificates and fixed
income securities such as government bonds, corporate, and bank bonds.
2We also include fund shares from Riester or Rürup contracts.
3Participants can name other assets which they own and are not part of the aforementioned instruments
like for instance options, futures or precious metals.
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Independent variables
Our independent variables are as follows:
Gender of the FKP. While other studies analyse the gender effect of a person in the
context of a single person’s portfolio, we will study how the gender of the FKP influences
a household’s investment behaviour. For this purpose we define a dummy variable of
the FKP’s gender which is one if the corresponding FKP is a woman.
Financial literacy of the FKP. The PHF survey also contains three financial literacy
questions, which have been broadly used in the literature on financial literacy (e.g.,
Bucher-Koenen et al., 2017) and cover knowledge about the compound interest effect,
inflation, and diversification. They are only answered by the household’s FKP. The
literature often codes this variable as an indicator variable (e.g., van Rooij et al., 2011).
For the regression analysis conducted in section 4, we use a dummy for financial illiteracy
which is 1 if the household’s FKP answers at least two of the three questions either wrong,
with “do not know”, or with “refuse to answer”.
Impatience of the FKP. A possible reason why individuals invest less extensively in
risky assets may be a lack of patience. Capital investments require great tenacity in
order to endure the ups and downs in the capital market. Therefore, an impatient
person may feel less inclined to invest in listed shares, fund shares, certificates or fixed
income securities. We therefore also control for the level of the FKP’s impatience, which
is self-assessed on a scale from 0 (very patient) to 10 (very impatient).
Other demographics of the FKP. Besides the aforementioned characteristics of a house-
hold’s FKP, we will use the FKP’s age, squared age, dummy variables for being married
and divorced or widowed, and a dummy variable if the household reports to have ob-
tained financial advice from its bank.
Household risk aversion. As argued in section 2, risk appetite is a crucial determinant
of capital market participation. In order to incorporate a household’s risk aversion in
our analysis, we use two different questions asked in the PHF, which are presented in
the appendix (boxes 1 and 2)4. The question presented in box 1 is only asked to FKPs
of multi-person households while the question shown in box 2 is asked to singles and
FKPs of households which answer the question in box 1 with “No uniform classification
is possible for the household as a whole.”.
With these questions, we construct a dummy variable for risk aversion in the way
illustrated in figure 1. That is, the dummy variable for risk aversion takes on a value of
1 if
i. the household’s FKP answers the question in box 1 with “We are not ready to take
any financial risks.” in a multi-person household,
4The PHF also asks the FKP to self-assess his or her general risk-taking preference on a scale from
0 (not at all willing to take risks) to 10 (very willing to take risks). We did not use this variable
to measure risk appetite because its explanatory power for capital market participation is weaker in
comparison to the constructed dummy variable for risk aversion in financial matters. That is in line
with Dohmen et al. (2011) and Halko et al. (2012) who find that risk measures on financial matters
are better predictors for the participation in the stock market than measures of general risk aversion.
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ii. the household’s FKP answers the question in box 2 with “I am not ready to take
any financial risks.” in case he or she answered the question in box 1 with “No
uniform classification is possible for the household as a whole.” in a multi-person
household or
iii. the household’s FKP answers the question in box 2 with “I am not ready to take
any financial risks.” in a single-person household.
Financial advice obtained from the household’s main bank. Households are asked
if they obtained financial advice from their main banks in the three years prior to the
interview. We code their answers as a dummy variable. While we have no information on
the frequency at which households consulted their banks, the content of these meetings
or if the household ever acted upon the advice that it receives, this variable gives a first
indication about the household’s general willingness to seek professional advice.
Household income. Household income is estimated by the FKP and measured in
e1,000. We perform a 98% winsorisation in order to lower the influence of the outliers
on the regression results. This is often done in the literature (e.g., Dimmock and
Kouwenberg, 2010; Clark and Mitchell, 2014). Using other conventional values does not
make a substantial difference in our results.
Household net wealth. We determine the household’s net wealth by subtracting the
household total debt (all liabilities) from the household’s gross wealth (all assets). House-
hold net wealth is measured in e10,000. Moreover, we perform the same winsorisation
as with the household income.
Children in the household. The number of children in a household is defined as the
number of persons aged 15 years or younger. In our empirical analysis, we will use a
dummy variable which is 1 if there is at least one child in the corresponding household.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the derivation of the dummy variable for risk aversion
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Note: This figure illustrates how the dummy variable for risk aversion is derived with the help of the questions in box 1 and 2 from the Deutsche
Bundesbank PHF of the year 2014. In the first step, the households were divided into single households and multi-person households. Single
households had to answer the question in box 2 and are characterised as risk averse if they answered this question with “I am not ready to take
any financial risks.”. For a multi-person household the FKP first answered the question in box 1. If he or she answered this question with “No
uniform classification is possible for the household as a whole.”, he or she had to answer the question in box 2. Multi-person households are
characterised as risk averse if the FKP answered the question in box 1 with “We are not ready to take any financial risks.” or the question in box 2
with “I am not ready to take any financial risks.” given a non-uniform risk classification for the household.
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3.2 Descriptives
In table 1 we present the descriptive statistics for the variables introduced in subsection
3.1 for all households. An overview of the different types of households is presented in
figure A.1. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the case that we only consider
households which participate in the capital market. The correlation matrix for the
independent variables is presented in table 3.
As we can see in figure 2, 25.82 percent of the households with male FKPs participate
in the capital market, while only 17.87 percent of the households with a female FKP
do so. When we only consider singles and single parents, the gender gap in the capital
market participation shrinks from 7.95 percent to 1.20 percent.
Figure 2: Capital market participation






female FKP male FKP
Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for households that participate in the capital
market. The average share of risky assets is 23 percent irrespective of the FKP’s gender.
A closer look into the portfolios of households participating in the capital market leads
us to remarkable gender gaps in the participation rates in listed shares and certificates.
Given capital market participation, 48 percent of the households with a male FKP invest
in listed shares compared to 35 percent of those with a female FKP. The corresponding
gender gap in certificates amounts to 6 percent, where 9 percent of the households with
male FKP participate in certificates in comparison to 3 percent for those with female
FKP. A deeper analysis of these gender gaps will be presented in subsection 4.1.3.
The proportion of female FKPs is approximately 48 percent and varies significantly
between different types of households (see figure 3). Households in which we often
find female FKPs are those of widowed or divorced singles or single parents, where the
percentage of female FKPs amounts to 65.40 percent.
In section 1, we presented several papers showing that women are less financially
literate than men. Consistent with this literature, the proportion of financially illiterate
FKPs in our sample is higher for female FKPs.5 Moreover, female FKPs are about as
patient and as old as their male counterparts. Concerning the marital status, we notice
that female FKPs are less often married and more often divorced or widowed than male
FKPs.
5For a more detailed view on the FKPs’ financial literacy, see figure A.3 in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Proportion of female FKPs for different household characteristics
Couples with children under 16 years
Couples without children under 16 years













female FKP male FKP
Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
Also in accordance with the literature, especially Dohmen et al. (2011), Halko et al.
(2012) and Falk et al. (2018), households with female FKPs are less often willing to take
financial risks than households with male FKPs.6 Looking at table 1, three quarters of
the households with female FKPs are characterised as risk averse compared to 62 percent
of their male counterparts. If we only consider households participating in the capital
market (table 2), the proportion of risk averse households shrinks from 68 to 43 percent.
For households with female FKPs it decreases to 55 percent and to 35 percent for the
male counterparts. Moreover, in table 3 we find that risk aversion correlates positively
with being divorced or widowed and negatively with the household income.
The average household income amounts to approximately e2,440 (e2,270 for house-
holds with female FKP and e2,600 for households with male FKP). For households
participating in the capital market, the average income increases to e3,340 (e3,030 for
households with female FKP and e3,530 for households with male FKP). Households
with a female FKP own on average a net wealth of e179,000, which is lower than the
average net wealth of households with a male FKP (e237,100). If we consider only the
households participating in the capital market, the average net wealth is e396,300 for
households with female and e428,300 for households with male FKPs. Moreover, the
household net wealth is positively correlated with the household income.
Children are a bit more often found in households with a female FKP. One explanation
could be that in families, mothers often run the household’s day-to-day business and are
therefore often better informed about the financial situation.
6Here, we only discuss the descriptives for the dummy variable for risk aversion. The shares for the
answers to the risk aversion questions presented in boxes 1 and 2 are shown in figure A.2 in the
appendix.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
All households with female FKP with male FKP
(N = 4, 307) (N = 1, 834) (N = 2, 473)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Capital market participation (dummy) 0.23 – 0.19 – 0.27 –
Share of risky assets in the fin. assets (percent) 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.20
Participation in listed shares (dummy) 0.10 – 0.07 – 0.13 –
Participation in fund shares (dummy) 0.17 – 0.14 – 0.19 –
Participation in certificates (dummy) 0.02 – 0.01 – 0.02 –
Participation in fixed income securities (dummy) 0.04 – 0.04 – 0.05 –
Female FKP (dummy) 0.47 – 1 – 0 –
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) 0.13 – 0.17 – 0.09 –
Impatience of the FKP 4.61 3.56 4.60 3.53 4.62 3.58
Age of the FKP (years) 52.50 10.07 52.86 17.59 52.17 15.87
Married FKP (dummy) 0.49 – 0.44 – 0.53 –
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.24 – 0.32 – 0.17 –
Risk averse household (dummy) 0.68 – 0.75 – 0.62 –
Financial advice (dummy) 0.24 – 0.24 – 0.24 –
Household income (e1,000) 2.44 1.60 2.27 1.60 2.60 1.93
Household net wealth (e10,000) 20.95 53.14 17.90 47.50 23.71 60.77
Children in the household (dummy) 0.19 – 0.21 – 0.16 –
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Source: 2014 Deutsche
Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
13
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for households participating in the capital market
All households with female FKP with male FKP
(N = 1, 547) (N = 521) (N = 1, 024)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Capital market participation (dummy) 1 – 1 – 1 –
Share of risky assets in the fin. assets (percent) 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.27
Participation in listed shares (dummy) 0.43 – 0.35 – 0.48 –
Participation in fund shares (dummy) 0.73 – 0.76 – 0.71 –
Participation in certificates (dummy) 0.07 – 0.03 – 0.09 –
Participation in fixed income securities (dummy) 0.19 – 0.21 – 0.18 –
Female FKP (dummy) 0.39 – 1 – 0 –
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) 0.06 – 0.09 – 0.04 –
Impatience of the FKP 4.86 3.40 4.97 3.59 4.80 3.65
Age of the FKP (years) 53.48 26.91 53.61 25.40 53.40 25.19
Married FKP (dummy) 0.57 – 0.48 – 0.63 –
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.17 – 0.26 – 0.12 –
Risk averse household (dummy) 0.43 – 0.55 – 0.35 –
Financial advice (dummy) 0.40 – 0.45 – 0.37 –
Household income (e1,000) 3.34 3.01 3.03 2.74 3.53 2.97
Household net wealth (e10,000) 41.59 99.81 39.63 91.68 42.83 111.12
Children in the household (dummy) 0.20 – 0.21 – 0.20 –
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for households partici-
pating in the capital market. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
14
Table 3: Correlation matrix for the independent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Female FKP (dummy) 1
(2) Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) 0.1030 1
(3) Impatience of the FKP −0.0023 −0.0211 1
(4) Age of the FKP (years) 0.0174 0.1056 −0.0444 1
(5) Married FKP (dummy) −0.0825 −0.0615 0.0206 0.0970 1
(6) Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.1739 0.1172 −0.0768 0.3782 −0.5554 1
(7) Risk-averse household (dummy) 0.1327 0.1158 −0.0524 0.1963 0.0352 0.1323 1
(8) Financial advice (dummy) 0.0037 −0.0538 0.0378 0.0144 0.0566 −0.0508 −0.1373 1
(9) Household income (e 1,000) −0.1030 −0.1490 0.0589 −0.0574 0.3790 −0.2383 −0.2288 0.1271 1
(10) Household net wealth (e 10,000) −0.0637 −0.0801 0.0402 0.1188 0.1890 −0.0819 −0.1653 0.1264 0.4545 1
(11) Children in the household (dummy) 0.0734 −0.0239 −0.0020 −0.3585 0.2446 −0.1636 −0.0409 −0.0057 0.1939 0.0037 1
Note: This table shows the correlation matrix for the independent variables used in the analysis. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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3.3 Methods
We employ several methods to analyse the men’s and women’s capital market partici-
pation. To analyse if women participate less often in the capital market than men, we
will estimate different specifications of a simple OLS model for all households as well
as for singles and single parents, where the dummy variable for the capital market par-
ticipation is used as the dependent variable7. In all regressions, we take into account
the multiply imputed nature of the dataset and use bootstrapping method to estimate
variances.
At first, we regress the dummy variable for capital market participation only on the
FKP’s gender. After that, we add the FKP characteristics to the model, i.e., the dummy
variable for financial illiteracy, the impatience variable, the FKP’s age and age squared,
the dummy variable for a married FKP and the dummy variable for a divorced or
widowed FKP. Next, we add the dummy variable for risk averse households to the
model since we expect that risk aversion will have a strong influence on the R2 of the
regression. In the last step, we incorporate the following household characteristics in the
model: a variable indicating if the household obtained financial advice within the three
years preceding the survey, household income, household net wealth and the dummy
variable for children in the household. We report all these regressions separately in
order to show how adding more explanatory variables alters the coefficient on the female
dummy.
For certain significant independent variables in the OLS models described above, we
will also estimate OLS models in which these characteristics are used as dependent
variables in order to analyse if there are significant gender differences in these variables.
In the second step of our analysis, we will estimate different specifications of an OLS
model in which the household’s share of risky assets in the financial assets is used as the
dependent variable. We only consider households participating in the capital market.
Moreover, our analysis is divided into the analysis of all households and the analysis of
all singles and single parents—both conditional on capital market participation. The
independent variables are added to the model in the same way as in the model for the
capital market participation.
Third, we investigate the capital market portfolio of households participating in the
capital market with a focus on the FKP’s gender. At first, we perform a descriptive
analysis of the participation rates in different categories of capital market assets for
these households. For the categories of capital market assets in which there are bigger
gender gaps in the participation, we will estimate OLS models in order to figure out if
these gender gaps are significant when we control for other household characteristics.
Finally, we investigate the composition of the average capital market portfolio of the
households participating in the capital market by the FKP’s gender.
Financial advice can also influence how intensively households invest in risky assets.
Therefore, we investigate whether households have a higher probability of participating in
the capital market and hold different amounts of risky assets when they seek professional
investment advice from their main bank.
7We also ran logit and probit regressions which confirm our results.
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Lastly, we conduct a Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition to get insights into the origins
of the observed differential in capital market participation between men and women.
Traditionally, this method has been used to analyse gender wage gaps. In that litera-
ture, the explained component of the raw differential in wages is the fraction that can
be explained by differences in men’s and women’s endowment with human-capital indi-
cators, i.e., different levels of work experience or education. That explained component
measures changes in the outcome variable for the case that a woman has a man’s fac-
tor endowment. In this paper, it represents the hypothetical case that women in our
sample have men’s average endowments of, say, wealth or risk aversion. In the labour
literature, the unexplained component, by contrast, is the fraction of the wage gap that
arises due to different valuations of men’s and women’s human-capital indicators, i.e.,
discrimination. In our case, it measures the effect on the outcome variable for the case




4.1.1 Do households with female FKP participate less in the capital
market?
First, we investigate whether a household with a female FKP participates less in the
capital market if we control for different FKP and household characteristics. Ideally,
in multi-person households, we would observe each household member’s contribution to
the decision-making process and be able to derive the influence that each member has on
the end result. However, we can only observe the final decision in our data. Therefore,
we divide our analysis into two parts: one part in which we investigate all households
and another part in which we consider only singles and single parents.
We estimate different specifications of an OLS model in which the households’ capital
market participation is the dependent variable for all households and for singles and
single parents. The OLS regression results8 are shown in table 4.
Columns 1 to 4 show the regressions for all households. When we regress the capital
market participation only on the FKP’s gender, we obtain that being female has a highly
significant, negative association with the capital market participation of that household:
if the FKP is a woman, that rate drops by 7.95 percent relative to that of a male FKP.
However, this finding masks the fact that the lower participation rates observed among
women may be the result of different characteristics that are independent of the FKP’s
gender. Also, with an adjusted R2 of merely 1.5 percent, the female dummy explains
almost none of the variation in observed capital market participation rates.
Therefore, in column 2, we next include the FKP’s characteristics in the model. In this
regression, the gender gap drops by a third and remains highly significant. Consistent
with our expectations, financially illiterate and divorced or widowed FKPs are less likely
8Logit and probit regressions confirm our analyses.
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to own risky assets. By contrast, being married is positively correlated with capital
market participation. Moreover, there is an age affect that reflects the life cycle or
cohort trends. Somewhat surprisingly, higher levels of patience—needed to endure the
ups and downs in the stock market—make capital market participation less likely.
Since we consider capital market participation as ownership of risky assets, we expect
that adding the risk-aversion dummy to the model will result in a negative coefficient on
this variable. This hypothesis is confirmed according to column 3: the dummy variable
for risk aversion is highly significant and has a large economic influence on the capital
market participation. Given other characteristics, the likelihood of participating in the
capital market decreases by 26.93 percent if a household is risk averse. Moreover, the
adjusted R2 increases from 5.67 to 19.62 percent, which shows that risk aversion explains
a substantial part of the variation in capital market participation. Furthermore, addition
of the risk-aversion dummy reduces the influence of the gender dummy on the observed
participation rates by two-thirds relative to column 1. Most importantly, this renders
the gender gap only marginally significant.
In the last step of the analysis of the capital market participation for all households,
we add to the model household income and net wealth as well as the dummy variables for
financial advice obtained by the household’s main bank and whether there are children.
Almost all of these variables are significant with the expected signs, while we document a
marginally significant gender gap of 2.6 percent. Notably, the effect of obtaining financial
advice is economically and statistically significant. Furthermore, the dummy variable
for risk-averse households is still highly significant and carries the strongest discount on
the capital market participation, followed by the financial-advice dummy with an effect
size of 14 percent.
Having analysed the capital market participation of all households, we proceed with
singles and single parents. This group is of particular interest because the investment
decision is made by only one person while in multi-person households, it is typically
the result of a household discussion. The analysis is done in the same way as in the
investigation of all households. Columns 5 to 8 show the corresponding regressions.
Singles and single parents seem to stand out from the total group of households as
there is no significant gender gap to begin with when we regress participation on the
female dummy only, whereas in the regression with all households, we found a significant
gap of around 8 percent. A possible explanation could be that among singles, women
and men share more common characteristics than do households in the entire sample.
When we add FKP characteristics to the model in column 6, we see that it is other
factors rather than gender that influence how much one participates in the capital mar-
ket. For instance, we find that the FKP’s impatience and age positively influence the
capital market participation while the coefficients on the dummy variables for illiteracy
and divorced and widowed FKPs are significant and negative.
In column 7, we add the dummy variable for risk-averse households to the model. As
a result, the adjusted R2 increases from 4.28 to almost 15 percent, showing that risk
aversion explains a substantial part of the variation in the capital market participation.
Moreover, the coefficient on the risk aversion variable is significant and highly important
in economic terms, like in the analysis of all households. The coefficient for the dummy
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variable for a female FKP remains insignificant.
Finally, moving from column 7 to 8, we include household income and net worth
and dummy variables for financial advice and children. Only the divorced or widowed
dummy, age, risk aversion, the financial advice dummy and household income have sig-
nificant coefficients. Not surprisingly, the risk-aversion dummy has the largest negative
while the financial-advice dummy has the largest positive coefficient.
In a nutshell, in all regressions for singles and single parents, the dummy variable for
female FKPs is insignificant. This implies that once women decide for themselves, they
make the same investment decisions that a man with the same characteristics would
make. For the whole sample, we can conclude that there is a marginally significant
gender-induced investment gap in Germany and a much larger risk-aversion-induced one.
This echoes results by Halko et al. (2012), Almenberg and Dreber (2015), or Dimmock
et al. (2016).
Our previous analysis has shown that household risk aversion has a significant and
economically relevant effect on the household’s capital market participation. Given this
effect, we are interested if there is a gender gap in the household risk aversion if we
control for other household characteristics. The literature has shown that women are in
general more risk averse than men. Since we do not consider risk aversion on the level
of the individual but on the level of the household, the question arises if the higher risk
aversion of a female FKP also translates into a higher risk aversion of her household.
Moreover, we are also interested in gender gaps in the dummy variable for a financially
illiterate FKP and the FKP’s impatience—two variables which have a significant influ-
ence on the capital market participation according to our previous analysis. In order to
analyse the three named variables, we estimate different models with the three variables
as dependent variables for all households as well as for singles and single parents. The
corresponding regression results are shown in table 5.
Concerning the household risk aversion, we find a significant gender gap for the dummy
variable for risk-averse households, thereby confirming the studies by Dohmen et al.
(2011), Halko et al. (2012), Almenberg and Dreber (2015) and more recently, Falk et al.
(2018). What is remarkable is that we obtain this result both for all households as well
as for singles and single parents, where the gap is of approximately the same magnitude.
That is, it seems to be the case that the gender gap in risk aversion at the individual level
translates into a gender gap at the household level through the influence of the FKP on
a household’s investment strategy. The fact that the gender gap is of nearly the same
size both for all households and singles and single parents could imply that the gender
gap in the individual risk aversion of FKPs does not decrease through the household
investment decision process. The regression the sample containing all households also
reveals that married FKPs are 17.49 percent more likely to be risk averse than unmarried
FKPs. This result corresponds well with our finding of a less pronounced impact of risk
aversion on risky asset holding for single households that we presented in table 4.
Furthermore, we find that a higher household income significantly decreases the house-
hold’s likelihood of being risk averse. Also, households obtaining financial advice from
their main bank are less likely to be risk averse. This effect is economically large. While
there is a significant gender gap in the likelihood of an FKP being financially illiterate for
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all households but not for only singles, we do not find a significant correlation between
being illiterate and seeking professional investment advice. Lastly, there is no gender
gap in the impatience of the FKP.
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Table 4: Determinants of capital market participation
All households Singles and single parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0795∗∗∗ −0.0557∗∗∗ −0.0270∗ −0.0259∗ −0.0121 0.0129 0.0380 0.0357
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.1138∗∗∗ −0.0846∗∗∗ −0.0541∗∗∗ −0.0942∗∗∗ −0.0665∗∗ −0.0446
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0040 0.0089∗ 0.0068 0.0041
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0080∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ −0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.0017 0.0307 −0.0517∗∗ 0.0012 0.0293 0.0066
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0887∗∗∗ −0.0557∗ −0.0610∗∗ −0.1134∗∗ −0.0906∗ −0.0811∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Risk-averse household (dummy) −0.2693∗∗∗ −0.1981∗∗∗ −0.2153∗∗∗ −0.1662∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Financial advice (dummy) 0.1382∗∗∗ 0.1492∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0789∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0220 0.0603
(0.02) (0.06)
Constant 0.2582∗∗∗ −0.1464∗∗ 0.0127 −0.0236 0.1909∗∗∗ −0.2279∗∗ −0.1016 −0.1257
N 4461 4453 4453 4453 1042 1039 1039 1039
Adj. R2 0.0153 0.0567 0.1962 0.2701 0.0036 0.0428 0.1457 0.2548
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for different specifications of the capital market participation model for all available
households and only singles and single parents. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regression results for models with multiple dummy variables for the number of correctly
answered financial literacy questions and the degree of risk aversion based on the questions in box 1 and box 2 are shown in table A.1 in
the appendix. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table 5: Determinants of risk aversion, financial literacy and patience
Risk averse household Financially illiterate FKP Impatience of the FKP
All Singles and All Singles and All Singles and
households single parents households single parents households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.1006∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0296 0.0996 0.0584
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.21)
Risk-averse household (dummy) 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0673∗∗∗ −0.1414 −0.2556
(0.01) (0.03) (0.14) (0.21)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.1019∗∗∗ −0.0425 −0.2298
(0.02) (0.04) (0.18) (0.32)
Impatience of the FKP −0.0038 −0.0069 −0.0007 −0.0041
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0022 0.0011 −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗ −0.0262 −0.0879∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04)
Age2 of the FKP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0008∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.1749∗∗∗ 0.1223∗ 0.0129 0.0734 −0.1542 −0.0548
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.17) (0.63)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.1117∗∗∗ 0.0872∗ 0.0437∗ 0.0368 −0.4697∗∗ −0.4394∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.19) (0.25)
Financial advice (dummy) −0.1139∗∗∗ −0.0987∗∗∗ −0.0213 −0.0016 0.1579 0.1614
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12) (0.26)
Household income (e 1,000) −0.0547∗∗∗ −0.0582∗∗∗ −0.0189∗∗∗ −0.0239∗ 0.0766∗∗ 0.2270∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0004 0.0009 −0.0029
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0158 0.0727 0.0272 0.1046 −0.1461 −0.5303
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.20) (0.45)
Constant 0.5626∗∗∗ 0.5615∗∗∗ 0.2840∗∗∗ 0.2916∗∗∗ 5.3058∗∗∗ 6.8411∗∗∗
N 4453 1039 4453 1039 4453 1039
Adj. R2 0.1306 0.1205 0.0463 0.0609 0.0079 0.0262
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for different independent variables for all available households and only singles
and single parents. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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4.1.2 Conditional on capital market participation, is there a gender gap in
the portfolio’s share of risky assets?
Having analysed capital market participation of German households, we want to inves-
tigate the share of risky assets in a household’s total portfolio of financial assets, given
the household’s capital market participation. To this end, we will again divide our dis-
cussion into one part for all households and one part for singles and single parents. The
results of the regressions are presented in table 6.
First, we consider all households in columns 1 to 4. In column 1, where we regress
the risky share only on the dummy variable for a female FKP, it strikes that there is
no significant gender gap. That is, once a household has decided to hold risky assets,
women and men hold equal portions of them. In a sample of financially-trained persons
in Finland—a more gender-equal country than Germany9—a small but significant gender
effect remains after inclusion of risk aversion and many socioeconomic variables (Halko
et al., 2012). In that analysis, the controls reduce the raw gender gap of 5.4 percent
by about one half. A regression using a sample of students and investors rather than
retail bank clients, however, confirms our result of no gender difference in the risky asset
share.
In column 2, we add the FKP characteristics to the model, which only changes the
magnitude of the insignificant gender dummy. Moreover, we find a minuscule effect of
the FKP’s age. Once a household holds risky assets, FKP characteristics play virtually
no role.
Next, we additionally include the dummy variable for risk-averse households in the
model. This dummy variable has a significant and negative association with the risky
share: a risk-averse household participating in the capital market has on average a 4.28
percent lower risky share, again controlling for the other independent variables. This is
a substantial economic effect and underlines our results that differences in the FKP’s
risk aversion are the main driver for the more limited capital market participation of
households with a female FKP—precisely because of the higher risk aversion of women,
but not because of their gender per se.
Finally, household characteristics are incorporated in column 4. Adding these variables
to the model has nearly no effect on the adjusted R2, indicating that they only explain a
negligible part of the variation in the risky share. Moreover, adding these variables to the
model leaves the other variables’ coefficients virtually unaffected. The dummy variable
for a female FKP remains insignificant and the risk aversion has a strong influence on
the risky share of approximately the same magnitude as in column 3.
Following the analysis for all households, we only consider singles and single parents
to disentangle decisions made alone from those made jointly. The regression results are
presented in columns 5 to 8. In the first model we regress the risky share only on the
dummy variable for female FKPs. It is not surprising that we observe no significant
gender gap in the risky share. As for the case of all households, once single women
participate in the capital market and decide on their own, they choose risky asset shares
9The Global Gender Gap Report 2020, World Economic Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, 2020. In this
report, Germany ranks #10 (Finland: #3) out of 153.
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that are similar to those of men.
In columns 6 to 8, we add the FKP and household characteristics to the model, but
all coefficients are insignificant. Not even risk aversion seems to play a role for the
conditional risk share of singles and single parents. In spite of this, these variables do
add some incremental explanatory power compared to the model in column 5.
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Table 6: Determinants of the risky share in the financial assets
All households Singles and single parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0021 −0.0076 0.0005 0.0002 0.0114 0.0053 0.0170 0.0155
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.0019 0.0070 0.0065 0.0206 0.0293 0.0347
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Patience of the FKP −0.0037 −0.0040 −0.0038 −0.0017 −0.0028 −0.0018
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) −0.0034 −0.0036 −0.0032 −0.0036 −0.0034 −0.0019
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0368 −0.0322 −0.0281 −0.0750 −0.0746 −0.0979
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0177 −0.0126 −0.0130 −0.0326 −0.0269 −0.0301
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Risk-averse household (dummy) −0.0428∗∗ −0.0454∗∗ −0.0443 −0.0441
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Financial advice (dummy) −0.0102 −0.0320
(0.01) (0.03)
Household income (e 1,000) −0.0057 −0.0081
(0.00) (0.01)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0001 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0053 0.0265
(0.02) (0.08)
Constant 0.2345∗∗∗ 0.2989∗∗∗ 0.3133∗∗∗ 0.3188∗∗∗ 0.2518∗∗∗ 0.2970∗∗ 0.3070∗∗ 0.2855∗
N 1549 1547 1547 1547 251 251 251 251
Adj. R2 0.0280 0.0738 0.0962 0.0970 0.0010 0.0522 0.0591 0.0462
Note: This table shows regression results for different specifications of the OLS model for the risky share in the financial assets for
all households and only singles and single parents, given capital market participation. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regression results for models with multiple dummy
variables for the number of correctly answered financial literacy questions and the degree of risk aversion based on the questions in
box 1 and box 2 are shown in table A.2 in the appendix. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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4.1.3 Do women invest in different categories of capital market assets than
men?
In the last step of our analysis, we take a look at capital market portfolios of households
participating in the capital market. To this end, we will divide our discussion into one
part about participation rates in different categories of capital market assets and one
part about the composition of the typical capital market portfolio owned by a household.
In table 7, we report participation rates for different categories of capital market assets
for households participating in the capital market, separately for all households and for
singles and single parents.
Table 7: Participation in different categories of capital market assets
All households Female FKP Male FKP
Fund shares 75.90% 70.92%
Listed shares 35.37% 48.48%
Fixed income securities 21.28% 17.85%
Certificates 3.09% 8.77%
Singles and single parents Female FKP Male FKP
Fund shares 74.26% 64.55%
Listed shares 30.18% 53.42%
Fixed income securities 25.30% 20.01%
Certificates 2.30% 16.54%
Note: This table shows the households’ participation
rates in different categories of capital market assets by
gender, for households participating in the capital mar-
ket. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own cal-
culations.
When we consider all households, we notice that fund shares are the most popular
capital market asset independent of the FKP’s gender. Specifically, the participation
rate in funds shares is above 70 percent for both FKP genders. Listed shares are the
second most preferred asset class. But while 48.48 percent of the households with male
FKP invest in listed shares, only 35.37 percent of the household with female FKP do so.
We find the third highest participation rate for fixed income securities, which is nearly
the same for both FKP genders. Lastly, households with male FKP participate almost
three times as much in certificates as households with female FKP.
As a conclusion for all households, we can say that households with male FKP invest
more often in the riskier categories of capital market assets—a result which is consistent
with our finding that households with male FKP are less risk averse than households
with female FKP.
For the participation rates of singles and single parents, we obtain a picture similar
to the one for all households. For both genders, we find the highest participation rate
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Table 8: Determinants of the participation in listed shares and certificates
Listed shares Certificates
All Singles and All Singles and
households single parents households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0867∗∗ −0.1702∗ −0.0563∗∗ −0.1598∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.05)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.0167 0.0425 −0.0375∗∗ −0.0076
(0.09) (0.18) (0.02) (0.04)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0139 0.0116 0.0098∗∗ 0.0221∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0089 −0.0023 −0.0021 −0.0088
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0860 −0.0245 −0.0342 0.0418
(0.06) (0.26) (0.03) (0.12)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0840 0.0024 0.0090 0.0686
(0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05)
Risk-averse household (dummy) −0.1252∗∗∗ −0.1047 −0.0563∗∗∗ −0.0668
(0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.05)
Financial advice (dummy) −0.0562 −0.0667 0.0469∗∗ 0.1012∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0283∗∗ 0.0252 −0.0016 −0.0415∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0007∗∗ 0.0003 0.0002∗ 0.0007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) −0.0665 −0.2602∗ −0.0360 −0.0439
(0.06) (0.15) (0.02) (0.05)
Constant 0.0815 0.4887 0.1332 0.3721
N 1547 251 1547 251
Adj. R2 0.1036 0.0895 0.0568 0.0515
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for the participation in listed shares and certificates
for all available households and only singles and single parents, given capital market participation.
***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Regression results for models with multiple dummy variables for the
number of correctly answered financial literacy questions and the degree of risk aversion based on
the questions in box 1 and box 2 are shown in table A.3 in the appendix. Source: 2014 Deutsche
Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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for fund shares, however, for singles and single parents we now find a differential of
around 10 percentage points between men (64.55%) and women (74.26%). While there
is a notable difference in the participation in fixed income securities, we find substantial
gender gaps in the participation in listed shares and certificates bigger in size than the
ones for all households.
In a nutshell, we find more pronounced gender gaps in the participation rates for listed
shares and certificates; a result which leads us to the question if these gender gaps are
significant when we control for several household characteristics. In order to answer this
question, we perform several regressions for all households and for singles and single
parents participating in the capital market. We report these results in table 8.
Concerning the participation in listed shares, we document a significant gender gap
for all households as well as for singles and single parents. The participation rate for
listed shares is ceteris paribus 8.67 percent lower for households with female FKP when
we consider all households. For singles and single parents, the corresponding gender gap
amounts to 17.02 percent. That is, the gender gap in the participation in certain risky
assets decreases in multi-person households, an observation which could be explained by
household discussions concerning financial decisions.
Furthermore, we find that the household’s risk aversion, household income and net
wealth have a significant effect on the participation in listed shares of all households
participating in the capital market. If we only take a look at the regression for singles
and single parents, we find no significant variable other than the FKP’s gender and
minors in the household—not even risk aversion. This is in line with our previous
findings in tables 4 and 6 where we found that FKPs investing only for themselves react
differently to risk aversion than FKPs in multi-person households, whose investment
decisions also affect others. Another explanation could be the fact that singles hold on
average lower proportions of listed shares than FKPs living in multi-person households:
it is conceivable that singles do not invest in stocks with a long-term investment goal
but as a hobby, possibly rendering risk aversion less of an issue for them.
In the second half of the table, we consider the regression results for the participation
in certificates. For all households as well as for singles and single parents we obtain
that households with female FKP participate significantly less in certificates, where
the coefficient for singles is around 16 percent. The corresponding gender gap for all
households is 5.63 percent. Again, the gender gap in the participation is larger for singles
and singles parents than for the whole set of households.
In addition, the FKP’s literacy and patience, the dummy variables for risk-averse
households and financial advice and household net wealth have significant effects on the
participation in certificates in the regression for all households. For singles and single
parents, the coefficients on net wealth becomes insignificant, but household income is
significantly related to certificate-holding, albeit surprisingly in a negative manner. An
explanation could be that certificates are often viewed as a possibility to quickly earn a
lot of money, and this gamble could look attractive to households with lower incomes.
Figure 4 and figure 5 depict the composition of the average capital market portfolios
held by households with (a) female and (b) male FKP as well as the corresponding
medians of the capital market portfolios for all households and for singles and single
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Figure 4: Composition of the capital market portfolio for all households

















Note: This figure shows the average proportions of different categories of capital market assets for all
households participating in the capital market divided by female and male FKP as well as the
corresponding medians of the capital market portfolio. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own
calculations.
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Figure 5: Composition of the capital market portfolio for singles and single parents

















Note: This figure shows the average proportions of different categories of capital market assets for
singles and single parents participating in the capital market divided by female and male FKP as well




Note that the median of the capital market portfolio of households with female FKP
is e 11,400, which is lower than the median for households with male FKP (e 14,600).
While single women and single mothers’ average portfolio is a bit smaller than that of
the average female household (e 11,000), single men’s and single fathers’ is larger than
that of the average male household (e 16,700). From the composition of the average
portfolios we learn that, independent of the FKP’s gender, households invest most of
their wealth into fund shares and listed shares. The average female FKP invests 65.47
percent of her household’s capital market portfolio in fund shares and 22.83 percent in
listed shares. For households with male FKP, the average share of fund shares amounts
to 57.05 percent while the average share of listed shares is 31.40 percent.
The average share for fixed income securities is roughly the same for both types of
households. For the average share of certificates, we confirm our previous results that
households with a male FKP invest a higher (albeit negligible) fraction of their wealth
in certificates than households with a female FKP.
Comparing figures 4 and 5, we note that the median values of the capital market
portfolios held by women are comparable for all households and for singles , but single
men hold larger portfolios than the average man. In terms of the average portfolio
composition, those of female singles and the average female FKP are almost identical,
while there are bigger differences for men: male singles invest less in fund shares than
does the average male FKP in the all-households sample. Instead, they hold larger
proportions of listed shares, fixed income securities and more than twice as much in
certificates.
In a nutshell, we observe remarkable gender differences in the composition of capital
market portfolios, which are more pronounced for singles and single parents. In order
to see if these differences are significant, we perform several regressions for the condi-
tional capital market assets’ proportions for the two household types. The corresponding
results are reported in table 9.
In line with previous results, we find that women tend to hold significantly higher
proportions of fund shares than men when we control for FKP and household charac-
teristics. For single women and single mothers, however, the coefficient is negative. The
same is true for listed shares and certificates: single women are less likely to invest in
these asset categories than comparable men. The dummy variable for risk aversion is in-
significant in all models. People seeking financial advice are more likely to invest in listed
shares. Interestingly, singles and single parents seem to be advised to invest less in fund
shares and more in certificates. Children make a difference too: the coefficient is positive
and large for fixed income securities for the average household, but large and negative
when we look at single households only. The negative association is even stronger for
households holding certificates. Also, households tend to hold lower proportions in listed
shares when there are children in the household.
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Table 9: Determinants of the share of different categories of capital market assets in the capital market portfolio
Fund shares Listed shares Fixed income securities Certificates
All Singles and All Singles and All Singles and All Singles and
households single parents households single parents households single parents households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) 0.0712∗∗ −0.0631∗ 0.0126 −0.0206∗∗ 0.1445 −0.1006 0.0201 −0.0640∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.0680 0.0481 0.0314 −0.0115∗ −0.0505 0.0755 −0.0144 −0.0106
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.01) (0.19) (0.16) (0.10) (0.02)
Impatience of the FKP −0.0030 0.0061 −0.0049 0.0018 0.0082 0.0047 −0.0164∗ 0.0035
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Age of the FKP (years) −0.0035 0.0028 0.0028 −0.0022 0.0030 −0.0068 0.0094 −0.0056
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.0683 −0.0481 −0.0139 −0.0063 −0.2841 0.0208 0.2547 0.0086
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.03)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.0397 −0.0383 −0.0179 0.0164 −0.0720 −0.0370 0.0685 0.0405∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
Risk-averse household (dummy) 0.0326 −0.0380 0.0087 −0.0033 −0.0132 −0.0623 0.0611 0.0145
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.03)
Financial advice (dummy) 0.0477 −0.1082∗∗∗ 0.0413∗ 0.0192∗∗ 0.0363 −0.0792 −0.0016 0.0446∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
Household income (e 1,000) −0.0238∗∗ 0.0234∗∗ −0.0015 0.0018 −0.0273 0.0363 −0.0055 −0.0035
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) −0.0005 0.0004 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0004 0.0005 −0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0767 −0.0317 −0.0334∗ −0.0116 0.4233∗∗∗ −0.1634∗ −0.2309∗∗ −0.0290
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.02)
Constant 0.8465∗∗∗ 0.0916 −0.0103 0.0722 0.4962 0.3602 −0.0425 0.1862
N 1536 1536 1536 1536 248 248 248 248
Adj. R2 0.0766 0.0530 0.0371 0.0099 0.0378 0.0250 0.0087 0.0000
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for different independent variables for all available households and only singles and single parents participating
in the capital market. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Regression results for models with multiple dummy variables for the number of correctly answered financial literacy questions and the degree of risk aversion
based on the questions in box 1 and box 2 are shown in table A.4 in the appendix. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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4.2 The role of financial advice
In this subsection, we make further use of the financial advice variable which we have used
only as a control variable so far. Since we found significant and large positive coefficients
in our regression of capital market participation, we now go a step further: table 10
reports the regression results for the research question on capital market participation—
but this time, run separately for groups reporting that they do versus do not obtain
financial advice from their main bank.
We find that only in the subset of all households that do not obtain financial advice,
there is a statistically significant gender gap of 3.17 percent. That is, female FKPs
who do not seek financial advice from their banks are less likely to own risky assets
than comparable men. In the subsamples of households who do consult their banks for
financial advice, there is no such gap. There is also none in the group of singles and
single parents even in the absence of financial advice. This is not surprising as we did
not find a gender gap for this group in the regression reported in table 6.
Single households looking for professional investment advice appear to be advised by
their banks to invest according to their life cycle. By far the largest influence on capital
market participation has, again, the risk-aversion dummy. In all but the last column,
its effect is significantly negative and decreases the likelihood of participating in the
capital markets by up to 21 percent, but it is slightly less relevant for single households.
Household income is positively related to capital market participation in all cases but
for singles who seek financial advice. Lastly, there is a positive relationship with the
dummy for children in households with singles parents which is not present in any of the
other regressions. One explanation could be that single parents with children may seek
bank advice to save for their children’s education.
To sum up briefly, there is only one instance where we find a significant gender effect,
namely in the subsample of households who do not obtain financial advice. That is, given
all other control variables, women that do not consult their banks are less active in the
capital market than their male counterparts. The risk-aversion dummy carries more
weight in the regressions of households who do not obtain financial advice from their
bank. One possible explanation could be that households seeking investment advice have
already taken the first hurdle toward investing in risky assets, unlike their counterparts
that do not seek financial advice because they may be more risk averse in the first place.
This result is confirmed by our analyses in table 11.
In table 11 we analyse the relationship between taking financial advice from a bank
and potential correlating factors both for all and for only single households. Our results
show that independent of the sample, women seek financial advice between 3.5 and 5.9
percent more often than their male counterparts, given all other variables. What also
plays a role consistently is household income and net wealth, where better-off households
are more likely to either consult their banks for advice or are to be approached by their
banks. Risk aversion has the strongest adverse impact: all household types are 8.4 to
10.6 percent less likely to take financial advice when they are risk averse, i.e. households
that are relatively risk loving self-select into seeking financial advice. Notably, financial
illiteracy is uncorrelated with households’ propensity to seek investment advice.
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Table 10: Determinants of capital market participation for households that obtain finan-
cial advice from their bank and those that don’t
Singles and
All households single parents
w/o FA with FA w/o FA with FA
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0317∗ −0.0053 0.0190 0.0956
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.0372∗ −0.0987 −0.0217 −0.1025
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.11)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0025 0.0068 −0.0020 0.0206
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0039 0.0179∗∗ 0.0008 0.0290∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0002∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0410 −0.0983 −0.0058 0.1752
(0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.30)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0358 −0.1555∗ −0.0456 −0.2078
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.14)
Risk-averse household (dummy) −0.2136∗∗∗ −0.1607∗∗∗−0.1847∗∗∗−0.1058
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.0407∗∗ 0.1010∗∗∗ 0.0290
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0009∗∗ 0.0009∗∗ 0.0002 0.0011
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0382 −0.0220 0.1021∗ −0.2441
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17)
Constant 0.0780 −0.2138 0.0702 −0.5533∗∗
N 3224 1229 797 242
Adj. R2 0.2570 0.1876 0.2014 0.1844
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for capital market participation for all
available households and only singles and single parents. ***, ** and * denote the
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Regression results for models with multiple dummy variables for the
number of correctly answered financial literacy questions and the degree of risk aversion
based on the questions in box 1 and box 2 are shown in table A.5 in the appendix.
Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
34
Table 11: Determinants of the propensity to seek financial advice
All Singles and
households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) 0.0351∗ 0.0591∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.0338 −0.0021
(0.03) (0.05)
Patience of the FKP 0.0040 0.0037
(0.00) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0048 0.0043
(0.00) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.0017 −0.0896
(0.03) (0.07)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0344 −0.0402
(0.03) (0.04)
Risk-averse household (dummy) −0.1064∗∗∗ −0.0845∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0150∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0013∗
(0.00) (0.00)




Adj. R2 0.0430 0.0640
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for the probability
of obtaining financial advice from a bank for all households or only
singles and single parents. ***, ** and * denote the statistical signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Regression results for models with multiple dummy
variables for the number of correctly answered financial literacy ques-
tions and the degree of risk aversion based on the questions in box
1 and box 2 are shown in table A.6 in the appendix. Source: 2014
Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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4.3 Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of capital market participation
To further analyse the systematic differences between the average endowments with
socioeconomic factors of men and women, we conduct a Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition
of the 7.87 percentage points participation gap in the capital market. This procedure
will allow us to determine what fraction of this differential is explained by gender-specific
endowments (e.g., income, age, or risk aversion) rather than by gender-specific regression
coefficients (e.g., behavioural differences between men and women). First, we will analyse
capital market participation for both genders separately and test if the coefficients vary
with the investor’s gender. Second, we will decompose the differences in the outcome
variable into contributing factors. We do this for capital market participation and in
the all-households sample only, since we did not find a significant gender effect for the
conditional risky share or the subsample of singles and single households in the previous
sections, whereas FKP characteristics seem to play a minor role.
Table 12 illustrates the results for the regressions by gender. Independent of the FKP’s
gender, households are less likely to participate in the capital market when their risk-
aversion is high. Curiously, however, the participation discount for risk-averse households
is much stronger for households with male than for those with female FKPs: male, risk-
averse FKPs are 25.83 percent less likely to invest in the capital market than comparable
FKPs that are not risk-averse; for women, it is only 11.91 percent.10 Overall, the results
in this table give rise to the notion that the differential in capital market participation
may be explained by differences in one or more of the characteristics at the household
level.
To check if the coefficients vary systematically with the investor’s gender, we then run
a regression of capital market participation on the female dummy and its interactions
with all the other explanatory variables. If the interaction terms are jointly significantly
different from zero, a Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition is in order, which will permit us
to analyse which socioeconomic variables contribute how much to the observed gender
gap. We do not report these results here in the interest of space, but the test is highly
significant; thus, the explanatory variables have differential effects on the outcome vari-
able for men and women. This result is the basis of our Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition,
which is documented in table 1311.
The model decomposes the raw differential of 7.87 percentage points resulting from
predicted participation rates of 25.78 percent for men and 17.91 percent for women. Of
this gap, two thirds can be explained by differences in the genders’ observable factor
endowments. Overall, it is household characteristics (55.91 percent)—not personal char-
acteristics of the FKP (11.13 percent)—that explain the observed gender gap. Which of
the variables in our model contribute most to this gap? Clearly, the average endowment
10In another, unreported regression, we find that this difference is less striking for singles and single
parents: single men are 20.96 percent (p < 0.01) less likely to hold risky assets if they are risk averse,
whereas for comparable women this probability is 10.93 percent (p < 0.10).
11We conduct the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition using each of the five imputed datasets separately.
Instead of computing average effects over these five results along with correct inference, we chose to
report the regression output using the first implicate only as the results do not differ notably among
these five sets of coefficients.
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Table 12: Determinants of capital market participation by gender for all households
Female FKP Male FKP
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) −0.0414∗∗ −0.0796∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0027 0.0064∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0050 0.0084∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 −0.0001
(0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.1001∗∗∗ −0.0083
(0.04) (0.04)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0760∗∗ −0.0652
(0.04) (0.04)
Risk-averse household (dummy) −0.1191∗∗∗ −0.2583∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Financial advice (dummy) 0.1536∗∗∗ 0.1209∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)




Adj. R2 0.2394 0.2759
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for all households
by the FKP’s gender. ***, ** and * denote the statistical sig-
nificance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Regression results for models with multi-
ple dummy variables for the number of correctly answered financial
literacy questions and the degree of risk aversion based on the ques-
tions in box 1 and box 2 are shown in table A.7 in the appendix.
Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table 13: Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition: determinants of the gap in capital market
participation by gender, all households
Explained component Unexplained component
% of raw % of raw
Effect differential Effect differential
FKP characteristics
Financially illiterate FKP (dummy) 0.0037∗∗ 4.74 −0.0045 −5.66
(0.00) (0.01)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0000 0.00 0.0144 18.29
(0.00) (0.03)
Age of the FKP (years) −0.0044 −5.63 0.1440 183.01
(0.01) (0.33)
Age2 of the FKP 0.0041 5.20 −0.0690 −87.63
(0.00) (0.17)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0046∗ −5.86 0.0471∗ 59.92
(0.00) (0.03)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.0090∗∗ 12.62 0.0047 6.01
(0.00) (0.02)
Household characteristics
Risk-averse household (dummy) 0.0242∗∗∗ 30.81 −0.1031∗∗∗ −130.96
(0.00) (0.03)
Financial advice (dummy) −0.0005 −0.58 −0.0072 −9.16
(0.00) (0.01)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0168∗∗∗ 21.34 0.0062 7.82
(0.00) (0.03)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0050∗∗ 6.34 −0.0206∗∗ −26.23
(0.00) (0.01)
Children in the household (dummy) −0.0016 −2.02 0.0057 7.21
(0.00) (0.01)
Constant 0.0082 10.36
Of raw differential (0.0787∗∗∗) 0.0527∗∗∗ 67.03 0.0259 32.97
N 4453
Note: This table shows Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition results for all households by the
FKP’s gender using the first implicate only, where results using the other implicates yield
identical results. The composition is expressed from the viewpoint of female FKPs. ***,
** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. We restrict this analysis to the binary risk aversion and
financial illiteracy variable. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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with risk aversion of female FKPs’ households is an important determinant, explaining
30.81 percent of the gender gap in capital market participation and about half of the
explained component. Had female FKPs in our sample the same average level of risk
aversion as men but women’s typical behaviour, ceteris paribus, their predicted par-
ticipation rate would be higher by 2.42 percentage points. Moreover, lower household
income, net wealth and financial literacy compared to their male counterparts disfavour
women as well, since they would be more likely to participate in the capital market if
the means of these variables were identical to men’s. Another factor contributing to the
gap is women’s higher propensity of being widowed.
The unexplained component of the gap measures the change in the predicted capital
market participation if a typical, female FKP had a typical, male FKP’s coefficients,
i.e., if she behaved like a man without having his endowments, though. Any significant
coefficient in the second-to-last column of table 13 thus indicates that the relationship
between the respective variable and capital market participation is different for men
and women. In fact, we find that if a woman had a man’s risk aversion coefficient, her
predicted capital market participation would be reduced by 10.31 percent. Although
this is in line with our finding of different coefficients on risk aversion in table 12, it is
still surprising as it implies that men are actually more sensitive to risk aversion than
women and that extremely risk-averse men may shy away from risky assets to a greater
extent than similarly risk-averse women. Unfortunately, the data do not permit greater
analysis of risk aversion within the answer category referring to the highest household
risk aversion. Further, married men seem to behave differently relating to capital market
participation than married women. Lastly, household net wealth is another important
factor. It appears that men use additions to their household net wealth differently than
women. Had our average female FKP an average male FKP’s wealth coefficient, then
she would be less likely to own risky assets. This could be because wealthy men may
own risky assets whereas when they become richer, they may substitute them with other
investments .
5 Conclusion
To shed further light on the gender investment gap, we analysed if capital market par-
ticipation as well as investment portfolios differ between women and men in Germany.
To do, we make use of a handful of behavioural variables that are available in the 2014
Deutsche Bundesbank PHF dataset and which have not yet been used in the literature
to study this research question for the case of Germany. This is surprising as these
variables—most notably risk aversion—are of paramount importance for the decision
whether or not to participate in the capital market and invest in risky assets.
Our results confirm the common view that women are not very active in the capital
market. However, their limited capital market participation can only be explained to
a small extent by their gender and much more by their relatively low risk tolerance.
In fact, when we look at participation rates while controlling for risk aversion, the gap
shrinks drastically, and when we additionally control for a range of factors at the FKP
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and household level, there is a 2.6 percent gap left. That is, unlike e.g., Haliassos and
Bertaut (1995), Almenberg and Dreber (2015) or Dimmock et al. (2016), we find a
persistent but small gender gap in our full models. The effect of impatience on whether
and how households invest in the capital market is negligible, whereas we document
larger discounts in capital market participation for financially illiterate households and
premiums for households seeking investment advice. Most of the gap in participation
rates can be explained by factors that are on average more unfavourable for women.
Once households have decided to own risky assets, we find no differences in the share
of risky assets held by women or men. The coefficient on risk aversion in the sample of
singles and single parents is insignificant, which is consistent with the above explanation
of risk attitude in different household types.
Moreover, we document that women not only are less often involved in the capital mar-
ket, but when they are, they choose their risky assets differently than men. While men
more often invest in individual, listed shares and certificates, their female counterparts
prefer to diversify by investing higher fractions of their wealth in fund shares and lower
fractions in listed shares and certificates. This rather conservative investment outcome
echoes their risk attitude. However, single women and single mothers own significantly
lower shares of different risky assets than comparable men, even when we control for
personal and household characteristics.
In a nutshell, men and women with similar risk attitudes and other characteristics
are both likely to shy away from holding risky assets, irrespective of their gender. This
implies that it could well be that a relatively risk-loving woman holds more risky assets
than a relatively risk-averse man. We therefore conclude that the investment gap found
between men and women is not mostly gender-induced but rather risk-aversion-induced.
This paper also raises interesting questions for future research. One pertains to the
FKP’s risk aversion in different household types. Our regressions of risk aversion on
gender and other factors reveal that a single female FKP’s risk aversion appears to
make its way through the joint financial decision-making process even if she becomes
the FKP in a multi-person household. Future research into this could therefore attempt
to lay open the role of joint financial decision making in shaping someone’s risk attitude.
Also, our analyses reveal that the strength of the FKPs’ reaction towards their own risk
aversion differs by the investor’s gender. That is, risk-averse men are much less likely
to hold risky assets than risk-averse women even though the average man has a higher
probability to participate in the capital market than the average woman. Investigating
this phenomenon in greater detail was beyond the scope if this paper.
Our paper also has an important policy dimension. Women have a higher average
life expectancy than men and therefore, have to save more over their lifetime to sustain
their desired consumption levels during retirement. Our results show that there is a small
but persistent gender gap in capital market participation even if we compare women to
otherwise identical men. If women systematically shy away from risky assets, they may
forgo attractive investment possibilities that would in fact be commensurate with their
risk attitude and that would otherwise help them build up wealth for retirement.
40
Appendix
Box 1: Question about risk aversion for multi-person households
If savings or investment decisions are made in your household: Which of the statements on the
following list best describes the attitude toward risk? Try to characterize the household as a
whole, even if it is not always easy.
1. We take significant risks and want to generate high returns.
2. We take above-average risks and want to generate above-average returns.
3. We take average risks and want to generate average returns.
4. We are not ready to take any financial risks.
5. No uniform classification is possible for the household as a whole.
Box 2: Question about risk aversion for single households and households
with inconclusive risk aversion, i.e. the FKP answers “No uniform
classification is possible for the household as a whole.” in box 1
If you personally make the savings or investment decisions: Which of the statements on the
following list best describes your personal attitude toward risk?
1. I take significant risks and want to generate high returns.
2. I take above-average risks and want to generate above-average returns.
3. I take average risks and want to generate average returns.
4. I am not ready to take any financial risks.
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Figure A.2: Household risk aversion by gender and household type
(a) All households







female FKP male FKP
(b) Singles and single parents








female FKP male FKP
(c) Households participating in the capital market








female FKP male FKP
This figure shows the distribution of risk-aversion levels by gender and household type. Risk aversion
ranges from 1 = “We/I take significant risks and want to generate high returns” to 4 = “We are/I am
not ready to take any financial risk”. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Figure A.3: Female and male FKPs’ financial literacy
(a) Compound-interest effect







female FKP male FKP
(b) Inflation





female FKP male FKP
(c) Diversification








female FKP male FKP
This figure shows the FKPs’ answers to the Big Three questions which were used in the literature in
order to measure financial literacy (e.g. Bucher-Koenen et al., 2017). They cover knowledge about the
compound-interest effect, inflation and diversification. Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own
calculations.
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Table A.1: Determinants of capital market participation for different levels of risk aversion and financial literacy
All households Singles and single parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0795∗∗∗ −0.0485∗∗∗ −0.0213 −0.0212 −0.0121 0.0188 0.0443 0.0407
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.0324 0.0190 0.0048 0.0858∗ 0.0671 0.0487
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0746∗∗∗ 0.0586∗∗ 0.0336 0.1114∗∗∗ 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0666∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Three literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.1659∗∗∗ 0.1191∗∗∗ 0.0720∗∗∗ 0.1772∗∗∗ 0.1334∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0041∗ 0.0082 0.0056 0.0029
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0074
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ −0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.0031 0.0314 −0.0496∗ 0.0044 0.0275 0.0028
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0846∗∗∗ −0.0548∗ −0.0611∗∗ −0.1092∗∗ −0.0903∗ −0.0830∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Household’s risk aversion = 1 (dummy) 0.1490 0.1296 0.5625 0.5812∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.34) (0.32)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) 0.3245∗∗∗ 0.2897∗∗∗ 0.2419∗∗∗ 0.2160∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.2601∗∗∗ 0.1876∗∗∗ 0.2010∗∗∗ 0.1502∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Financial advice (dummy) 0.1396∗∗∗ 0.1516∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0208 0.0645
(0.02) (0.06)
Constant 0.2582∗∗∗ −0.2793∗∗∗ −0.3524∗∗∗ −0.2778∗∗∗ 0.1909∗∗∗ −0.3728∗∗∗ −0.4152∗∗∗ −0.3568∗∗∗
N 4461 4453 4453 4453 1042 1039 1039 1039
Adj. R2 0.0153 0.0734 0.2032 0.2745 0.0036 0.0540 0.1510 0.2596
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for different specifications of the capital market participation model for all available households and
only singles and single parents. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Risk-aversion dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = “We/I take significant risks and want to generate high returns”) to high risk
aversion (4 = “We are/I am not ready to take any financial risk”). Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table A.2: Determinants of the risky share in the financial assets for different levels of risk aversion and financial literacy
All households Singles and single parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0021 −0.0059 0.0060 0.0053 0.0114 0.0077 0.0320 0.0293
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.0831 0.0949∗ 0.0920 0.1863 0.1870 0.2129∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0449 0.0518 0.0479 0.1289 0.1329 0.1508
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Three literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0774 0.0781 0.0769 0.1591 0.1578 0.1747∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Impatience of the FKP −0.0033 −0.0043 −0.0041 −0.0014 −0.0050 −0.0042
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) −0.0034 −0.0037 −0.0032 −0.0032 −0.0036 −0.0022
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0347 −0.0281 −0.0240 −0.0675 −0.0741 −0.1024
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0142 −0.0110 −0.0112 −0.0277 −0.0287 −0.0318
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Household’s risk aversion = 1 (dummy) 0.1875∗∗∗ 0.1865∗∗∗ 0.2191∗∗∗ 0.2162∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) 0.0794∗∗ 0.0818∗∗ 0.1114∗ 0.1179∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.0364∗ 0.0390∗∗ 0.0317 0.0329
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Financial advice (dummy) −0.0066 −0.0254
(0.01) (0.03)
Household income (e 1,000) −0.0061∗ −0.0100
(0.00) (0.01)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0001 0.0006∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0071 0.0368
(0.02) (0.08)
Constant 0.2345∗∗∗ 0.2206∗∗ 0.1930∗∗ 0.1974∗∗ 0.2518∗∗∗ 0.1311 0.1131 0.0767
N 1549 1547 1547 1547 251 251 251 251
Adj. R2 0.0280 0.0752 0.1046 0.1054 0.0001 0.0634 0.0912 0.0816
Note: This table shows regression results for different specifications of the OLS model for the risky share in the financial assets for all available
households and only consider singles and single parents, given capital market participation. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at
the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Risk-aversion dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = We/I take
significant risks and want to generate high returns) to high risk aversion (4 = We are/I am not ready to take any financial risk). Source: 2014
Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table A.3: Determinants of participation in listed shares and certificates for different
levels of risk aversion and financial literacy
Listed shares Certificates
All Singles and All Singles and
households single parents households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0781∗ −0.1318 −0.0430∗∗ −0.1337∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.05)
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.1513 0.3032 0.0242 −0.0641
(0.24) (0.33) (0.04) (0.10)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.1432 0.3739 0.1028∗ 0.0400
(0.23) (0.32) (0.06) (0.11)
Three literacy question correct (dummy) 0.1401 0.2014 0.0413 −0.0851
(0.23) (0.30) (0.04) (0.10)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0132 0.0072 0.0089∗∗ 0.0209∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0088 −0.0031 −0.0021 −0.0095
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0815 −0.0538 −0.0325 0.0359
(0.06) (0.27) (0.03) (0.12)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0839 −0.0129 0.0026 0.0575
(0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05)
Household’s risk aversion = 1 (dummy) 0.2671 0.1676 0.0320 −0.0596
(0.24) (0.38) (0.18) (0.35)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) 0.2152∗∗ 0.3806∗∗ 0.2499∗∗∗ 0.3142∗∗
(0.09) (0.16) (0.07) (0.14)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.1187∗∗∗ 0.0899 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0544
(0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.05)
Financial advice (dummy) −0.0521 −0.0815 0.0472∗∗ 0.0882∗
(0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0286∗∗ 0.0284 −0.0001 −0.0403∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0007∗∗ 0.0005 0.0002 0.0008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) −0.0641 −0.2801∗ −0.0356 −0.0620
(0.06) (0.16) (0.02) (0.06)
Constant −0.1945 0.1507 0.0058 0.3651
N 1547 251 1547 251
Adj. R2 0.1049 0.1150 0.0629 0.0697
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for listed shares and certificates for all available house-
holds and only singles and single parents, given capital market participation. ***, ** and * denote the
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. Risk-aversion dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = We/I take significant risks and want to
generate high returns) to high risk aversion (4 = We are/I am not ready to take any financial risk).
Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table A.4: Determinants of the share of different categories of capital market assets in the capital market portfolio for different
levels of risk aversion and financial literacy
Fund shares Listed shares Fixed income securities Certificates
All Singles and All Singles and All Singles and All Singles and
households single parents households single parents households single parents households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) 0.0654∗ −0.0573∗ 0.0082 −0.0164∗ 0.1183 −0.0765 0.0112 −0.0530∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03)
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.2421 0.2024 −0.4526∗ 0.0080 0.0545 0.2849 −0.3135 −0.0258
(0.22) (0.16) (0.23) (0.01) (0.38) (0.24) (0.33) (0.02)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.2657 0.1133 −0.4118∗ 0.0328∗∗ −0.0549 0.2798 −0.2523 0.0273
(0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.02) (0.37) (0.27) (0.35) (0.03)
Three literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.2640 0.1214 −0.3982∗ 0.0128 0.1404 0.1764 −0.2886 −0.0283
(0.20) (0.14) (0.23) (0.01) (0.35) (0.24) (0.33) (0.02)
Impatience of the FKP −0.0018 0.0048 −0.0046 0.0016 0.0134 −0.0014 −0.0151 0.0031
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Age of the FKP (years) −0.0031 0.0024 0.0028 −0.0021 0.0048 −0.0079 0.0090 −0.0058
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.0695 −0.0430 −0.0206 −0.0058 −0.2290 −0.0281 0.2524 0.0046
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.21) (0.15) (0.23) (0.02)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) 0.0474 −0.0368 −0.0250 0.0144 −0.0504 −0.0510 0.0655 0.0359∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) 0.2393 −0.3329 −0.0017 0.0675∗ −0.1550 0.1564 −0.0937 0.0923
(0.27) (0.25) (0.06) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.09)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.2956 −0.3573 0.0335 0.0003 0.0163 0.0565 −0.0531 −0.0197
(0.26) (0.25) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
Household’s risk aversion = 4 (dummy) 0.3171 −0.3920 0.0471
(0.25) (0.24) (0.06)
Financial advice (dummy) 0.0491 −0.1023∗∗∗ 0.0339 0.0192∗∗ 0.0450 −0.0798 −0.0039 0.0386∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
Household income (e 1,000) −0.0241∗∗ 0.0238∗∗ −0.0020 0.0023 −0.0354 0.0411 −0.0026 −0.0031
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) −0.0005 0.0004 0.0001 −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0003 0.0004 −0.0001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0756 −0.0271 −0.0370∗ −0.0115 0.4389∗∗∗ −0.1638 −0.2379∗∗ −0.0372∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.02)
Constant 0.2873 0.3266 0.3684 0.0456 0.3520 0.1227 0.3075 0.2179∗
N 1536 1536 1536 1536 248 248 248 248
Adj. R2 0.0793 0.0552 0.0381 0.0111 0.0545 0.0338 0.0000 0.0080
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for different independent variables for all available households and only singles and single parents participating in
the capital market. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Risk-aversion
dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = We/I take significant risks and want to generate high returns) to high risk aversion (4 = We are/I am not ready to take
any financial risk). Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table A.5: Determinants of capital market participation for households that obtain fi-
nancial advice from their bank and those that don’t for different levels of risk
aversion and financial literacy
Singles and
All households single parents
w/o FA with FA w/o FA with FA
Female FKP (dummy) −0.0275∗ −0.0014 0.0248 0.1075
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09)
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.0352 −0.1619 0.0590 0.2757
(0.03) (0.20) (0.05) (0.23)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0419∗ −0.0823 0.0423 0.3393∗
(0.02) (0.18) (0.04) (0.20)
Three literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0741∗∗∗ −0.0208 0.0745∗∗ 0.3536∗
(0.02) (0.17) (0.03) (0.20)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0025 0.0066 −0.0036 0.0186
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0035 0.0186∗∗ −0.0003 0.0292∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0002∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0398 −0.0921 −0.0103 0.1429
(0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.36)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0358 −0.1499∗ −0.0459 −0.2086
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13)
Household’s risk aversion = 1 (dummy) 0.2131 −0.1509 0.6431∗ 0.1613
(0.18) (0.34) (0.32) (0.62)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) 0.2714∗∗∗ 0.3489∗∗ 0.1980∗∗ 0.2951
(0.06) (0.15) (0.09) (0.27)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.2029∗∗∗ 0.1534∗∗∗ 0.1674∗∗∗ 0.1007
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗ 0.1004∗∗∗ 0.0216
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗ 0.0002 0.0012
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Children in the household (dummy) 0.0368 −0.0129 0.1035∗ −0.2379
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.20)
Constant −0.1908∗∗ −0.3497 −0.1477 −1.0114∗∗∗
N 3224 1229 797 242
Adj. R2 0.2616 0.1893 0.2103 0.1811
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for capital market participation for all avail-
able households and only singles and single parents. ***, ** and * denote the statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Risk-aversion dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = We/I take significant risks and
want to generate high returns) to high risk aversion (4 = We are/I am not ready to take any
financial risk). Source: 2014 Deutsche Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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Table A.6: Determinants of the financial advice dummy for different levels of risk aver-
sion and financial literacy
All Singles and
households single parents
Female FKP (dummy) 0.0343∗ 0.0584∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.0905∗∗ 0.1192∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.1026∗∗ 0.0859
(0.04) (0.06)
Three literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0939∗∗ 0.0816
(0.04) (0.06)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0037 0.0035
(0.00) (0.01)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0049 0.0043
(0.00) (0.01)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) 0.0030 −0.0829
(0.03) (0.07)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0314 −0.0355
(0.03) (0.04)
Household’s risk aversion = 1 (dummy) −0.0485 −0.0863
(0.14) (0.17)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) 0.0104 −0.0175
(0.05) (0.06)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.1186∗∗∗ 0.0994∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0149∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0012∗
(0.00) (0.00)




Adj. R2 0.0454 0.0666
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for the probability of ob-
taining financial advice from a bank for all households or only singles and
single parents. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Risk-
aversion dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = We/I take significant
risks and want to generate high returns) to high risk aversion (4 = We
are/I am not ready to take any financial risk). Source: 2014 Deutsche
Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.50
Table A.7: Determinants of capital market participation by gender for all households for
different levels of risk aversion and financial literacy
Female FKP Male FKP
One literacy question correct (dummy) 0.0392 −0.0120
(0.04) (0.06)
Two literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0440∗ 0.0400
(0.03) (0.06)
Three literacy questions correct (dummy) 0.0748∗∗∗ 0.0794
(0.02) (0.05)
Impatience of the FKP 0.0019 0.0060
(0.00) (0.00)
Age of the FKP (years) 0.0050 0.0081∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Age2 of the FKP −0.0000 −0.0001
(0.00) (0.00)
Married FKP (dummy) −0.0920∗∗ −0.0082
(0.04) (0.04)
Divorced or widowed FKP (dummy) −0.0712∗ −0.0691
(0.04) (0.04)
Household’s risk aversion = 1 (dummy) −0.0333 0.2791
(0.16) (0.29)
Household’s risk aversion = 2 (dummy) −0.0416 0.3927∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07)
Household’s risk aversion = 3 (dummy) 0.1297∗∗∗ 0.2384∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Financial advice (dummy) 0.1500∗∗∗ 0.1241∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Household income (e 1,000) 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Household net wealth (e 10,000) 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)




Adj. R2 0.2418 0.2814
Note: This table shows OLS regression results for all households by the
FKP’s gender. ***, ** and * denote the statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Risk-
aversion dummies range from low risk aversion (1 = We/I take significant
risks and want to generate high returns) to high risk aversion (4 = We
are/I am not ready to take any financial risk). Source: 2014 Deutsche
Bundesbank PHF, own calculations.
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